Diamond v. Charles

LOCATION: Court in Ouachita County

DOCKET NO.: 84-1379
DECIDED BY: Burger Court (1981-1986)
LOWER COURT: United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

CITATION: 476 US 54 (1986)
ARGUED: Nov 05, 1985
DECIDED: Apr 30, 1986

Dennis J. Horan - on behalf of Appellants
R. Peter Carey - on behalf of Appellees

Facts of the case


Media for Diamond v. Charles

Audio Transcription for Oral Argument - November 05, 1985 in Diamond v. Charles

Warren E. Burger:

Mr. Horan, I think you may proceed when you're ready.

Dennis J. Horan:

Mr. Chief Justice and may it please the Court:

This is an appeal from a final judgment of the Seventh Circuit, an appeal brought by the intervening defendants in that case.

The first issue of the case is one that has been raised in the briefs about the standing of the intervening defendants to bring this appeal under the doctrine of case of controversy.

Three things happened below: There was a declaratory judgment; where was an injunction; and there was a judgment against the individual intervenors for $100,000 for legal fees.

The liability for the judgment will be appealed to the Seventh Circuit, but the amount of the judgment can only be litigated here because it's intertwined with the issues in this case, that is to say, who is the prevailing party on these issues.

If this Court reverses the Seventh Circuit, then the amount of the judgment will be lessened since they no longer are the prevailing parties on the issues before this Court.

The standing or the real controversy thus between the parties to this case is a very real sum of money, a judgment that runs in favor of the individual plaintiff physicians in this case and against the individual defendants intervenors whom I represent.

They represent, therefore, a far greater stake, one might say, in the outcome of this case than the intervening appellants in Bryant versus Yellin, who were given standing to appeal on the basis of the water problem that existed in the Imperial Valley on the problem that existed in the Imperial Valley on the standing argument that they desired to purchase farmlands in the Imperial Valley if farmland should become available because of the application of 46 in that case.

No one was required to sell, but standing to appeal was nonetheless granted for purposes of the appeal on the mere probability that someone might sell below market depending upon the outcome of Section 46.

Harry A. Blackmun:

Mr. Horan, again a matter of curiosity.

You started the case off with a man named Campbell as a plaintiff.

When did he get off the train?

Dennis J. Horan:

Pardon me, Judge?

Harry A. Blackmun:

One of your original plaintiffs was named Campbell.

Dennis J. Horan:


He is still in the case technically.

There has been no order dismissing him and no order removing him from the case.

Harry A. Blackmun:

But you don't even name him here as an Appellant.

Dennis J. Horan:


Technically, he is in the case; as far as all the parties are concerned, he has been removed.

It is not too different from what you heard in a previous argument.

Thus the litigants here, the intervening--

Harry A. Blackmun:

Are you representing him?

Dennis J. Horan:

--Yes, Your Honor.

Thurgood Marshall:

Was he on the notice of appeal?

Dennis J. Horan:

I'd have to check the notice of appeal, Your Honor.

I'm not quite sure.

Thurgood Marshall:

Well, my whole point is, how can he be here if he's not on the notice of appeal?

Dennis J. Horan:

If he's not on the notice of appeal, then he is not a party before this court.