Court of Appeal

Al-Adsani filed civil proceedings in August 1992 in England. He claimed financial damages against the Kuwait government and in December, 1992, he got a default judgment against the Sheikh in Kuwait. Latter, he obtained a renewed application from the Court of Appeal to serve the wit on the Kuwait Government in 1994. However, High Court in May 1995 held that State immunity is applicable to Kuwait in this case under the State Immunity Act 1978. It is to be recalled that this U. K act extends immunity to sovereign countries for acts done outside their jurisdiction, without a connoted exception for proceedings of torture.

Later this ruling was sustained by the Court of appeals and the plaintiff was restrained to apply for an appeal with the House of Lords. Further, all the efforts pursued by Al-Adsani to claim compensation from Kuwait government proved to be ineffective. With regard to article 3, the U. K. emphasized that the plaintiff’s lost his claim on three fators. Firstly the torture did not occur in the U. K. Secondly, any constructive requirements under article 3 could only applicable to avoidance of suffering and not stipulation of compensation and lastly the extension of exemption to Kuwait under U.

K legislations was not an infringement of its commitments under the caucus. With regard to the claim under article 6, the U. K. asserted that worldwide standards of global treaties, in addition to international law for public, required that exemption to authorities and State is to be respected. Vexed with English Court of appeals refusal to appeal to House of Lords, Al-Adsani filed a complaint with ECHR on 3 April 1997. However, on 9 February, 2000 only, Grand Chamber of European Commission has announced that the case was admissible after several preliminary rounds of hearing on the subject.

Before the ECHR, the plaintiff argued that the Britain was unsuccessful to get his right not to be tortured, divergent to Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights, read in conjunction with Articles 1 which deals with the obligation to respect human rights and also in contravention of Article 13 which deals with the right to an effective remedy. Further, he also contended that refusal to apply to House of Lords tantamount to infringement of his privilege of access to a court under Article 6, Section 1. The ECHR court recalled the decision made in the Soering v.

the United Kingdom which dealt with engagement undertaken under Article 1 by a Contracting State which is restricted to ‘securing’ , the listed privileges and independence to persons within its own “jurisdiction. ” Court observed that Articles 1 and 3 which require a number of optimistic requirements on the High Contracting Parties intended to cease and offer redress for torture and other forms of maltreatment. In Soering case, the ECHR Court held that Article has some, restricted, exterritorial usage, to the amount that the decision by a Contracting State to drive out a person might involve the obligation of that State under the Convention.

Further, where the considerable background had been exposed for believing that the individual concerned, if forced out, encountered a true peril of being inflicted to agony or brutal or humiliating treatment or penalty in the receiving State. In the verdict, it was highlighted that as far as any liability under the Convention might be sustained in such scenario, it would be sustained by the expelling Contracting country by reason of its having initiated action which had a direct outcome of an individual to the forbidden mal-treatment.

The ECHR court was of the opinion that the plaintiff did not assert that the purported torture was unleashed within the jurisdiction of United Kingdom or the authorities of the United kingdom had any informal relationship with its happening. In such scenario, it could not be held that United Kingdom was under an obligation to offer a civil remedy to the plaintiff as regards to the torture allegedly inflicted on plaintiff by the authorities of Kuwait. Hence, under this scenario, it can be held that there was no infringement of Article 3 of ECHR.