Stone v. Immigration and Naturalization Service

PETITIONER: Stone
RESPONDENT: Immigration and Naturalization Service
LOCATION: Phoenix Police Department

DOCKET NO.: 93-1199
DECIDED BY: Rehnquist Court (1986-2005)
LOWER COURT: United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

CITATION: 514 US 386 (1995)
ARGUED: Nov 28, 1994
DECIDED: Apr 19, 1995

ADVOCATES:
Alan B. Morrison - on behalf of the Petitioner
Beth S. Brinkmann - on behalf of the Respondent

Facts of the case

Question

Media for Stone v. Immigration and Naturalization Service

Audio Transcription for Oral Argument - November 28, 1994 in Stone v. Immigration and Naturalization Service

Audio Transcription for Opinion Announcement - April 19, 1995 in Stone v. Immigration and Naturalization Service

William H. Rehnquist:

The opinion of the Court number 93-1199, Stone versus Immigration Naturalization Service will be announced by Justice Kennedy.

Anthony M. Kennedy:

This is a short statute that gives rise to a long opinion.

The case involves rather narrow and technical question but it's one of the considerable importance to aliens who were been subjected to the deportation process and to their lawyers members of the immigration bar.

The question is always rules to determining when the time starts running on the 90-day appeal period for review of the order of the Board of Immigration Appeals in the Courts of Appeals.

When the Board of Immigration Appeals affirms the deportation or the alien has two avenues for relief.

One is to appeal to the Court of Appeals and the other is to ask the agency to reconsider.

The problem in this case arises when it so often happens; the alien exercises his right to choose both avenues of relief.

The question is, does the filing of a motion to reconsider, stop the clock from running on the 90-day period for appealing to the Court of Appeals.

The various circuits were divided on this issue, this case comes from the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Judicial Circuit, which held that once the Board issues the deportation order, the 90-day period starts to run, in a later motion for reconsideration does not stop the 90-day period from running on the underlying order, we agree with the Sixth Circuit.

In an earlier case from our court called Locomotive Engineers versus the Interstate Commerce Commission.

We explained that the normal rule in agency practice is that the filing of a motion to reconsider makes the underlying order non-final.

So, the appeal time does not start to run on the underlying order until the denial of the motion to reconsider, and then the time starts to run on both orders at once.

The alien who is the petitioner in this case would like us to adopt that rule here.

We decline to do so, because in 1990 Congress enacted the provision with several sections designed to expedite the deportation process and it directed that Courts of Appeals to consolidate the appeal from the underlying order and the appeal from the denial of the motion to reconsider, if both were pending before it.

And for reason stated in the opinion we conclude that this provision reflex Congress' intent to depart from the rule of Locomotive Engineers and we conclude that the appeal time from the deportation order is not told or interrupted by the filing of a motion to reconsider.

Thus, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals, Justice Breyer has filed a dissenting opinion and he has joined in that opinion by Justices O'Connor and Souter.