Lehmann v. United States ex rel. Carson or Carasaniti

PETITIONER: Lehmann
RESPONDENT: United States ex rel. Carson or Carasaniti
LOCATION: Military Stockade

DOCKET NO.: 72
DECIDED BY: Warren Court (1957-1958)
LOWER COURT: United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

CITATION: 353 US 685 (1957)
ARGUED: Mar 26, 1957 / Mar 27, 1957
DECIDED: Jun 03, 1957

Facts of the case

Question

Media for Lehmann v. United States ex rel. Carson or Carasaniti

Audio Transcription for Oral Argument - March 26, 1957 in Lehmann v. United States ex rel. Carson or Carasaniti

Audio Transcription for Oral Argument - March 27, 1957 in Lehmann v. United States ex rel. Carson or Carasaniti

Earl Warren:

-- M. Lehmann, Petitioner, versus United States of America in relation to Bruno Carson.

Mr. Carliner.

David Carliner:

May it please the Court.

Yesterday, we developed two arguments that Section 241 does not bear upon the issue whether the old law or the new law governs the respondent's case.

Our first argument as this Court may recall was that because the clauses upon which the Government rely in Section 241 are the very changes in the law which this Court said in the Schaumburg decision, called the savings clause into play, they cannot be construed to the exceptions to the savings clause.

Our second argument was that the legislative history of Section 241 and of Section 405 together with the congressional reliance upon the phrase, “notwithstanding Section 405 (b),” which the Government itself originated, offered and proposed to Congress, indicates that Section 241 (d) in the language of Menashe was not within the specific contemplation of Congress when it enacted that legislation and when it enacted the savings clause.

The argument that I had developed on that point has not been set forth in our brief.

But for the convenience of the Court, I direct Your Honors' attention to the fact that it's been set forth in the appendix of the Government's brief in the Schaumburg case, Number 48 in 1940 -- pardon me, 1954 term at pages 58 and at pages 62 of the appendix to the Government's brief in that case.

Our argument with regard to the phrase, “notwithstanding Section 405 (b),” I wish to make clear particularly because of Mr. Justice Burton's question is not that that specific phrase is necessary in order to make 241 (d) an exception to the savings clause.

Although, as the legislative draftsman, the implications of these phrases are not fully developed by me, but I would suggest in response to Mr. Justice Burton that perhaps this phrase might have served the purpose -- would have indicated that the savings clause was within the specific contemplation of Congress and it would cover the point that the -- and the position of the Government seeks to maintain to reach aliens who are not deportable under the new and old law but to make them deportable notwithstanding the old law.

And this is the phrase that I would suggest is that added to Section 241, there'd be the phrase that “Notwithstanding that such aliens were not deportable under the laws repealed by this Act.”

Now, that clause did not refer specifically to the savings clause, but I think that it has the virtue of having a specific contemplation that people who are not deportable under the prior law shall nevertheless be deportable under the new statute notwithstanding the provisions of the savings clause.

Now, the third argument which I was in the process of developing yesterday at the recess was that the language of the relevant provision of Section 241 and the 405 proves the correctness of the decisions below.

I had noted that the section -- that the second clause of Section 405 requiring that there be a specific provision otherwise, less the repealed statute should continue to govern was added to the statute after the first specific provision otherwise was in the statute and that its purpose, the very fact it was added subsequently must have clearly to indicate that Congress wanted to reinforce the intent that prior proceedings, prior statuses, prior conditions, continue to be in effect.

I had noted that with its barrel-like approach to the savings clause, the Government had overlooked the distinct requirements of the savings clause, one of them being the fact that there were two otherwise specifically provided clauses in the savings clause.

Perhaps the best way to demonstrate our point on this, if the Court will permit, is to examine the Hintopoulos case which this Court decided on Monday.

Now, in the Hintopoulos case, the aliens entered the United States illegally.

It was found in 1951 because when they entered, they entered with the intent of being immigrants and they had no immigrant visas in their possession in the time of entry.

The deportation proceedings in the Hintopoulos case were began in May of 1952 prior to the effective date of the 1952 Act.

And accordingly, the basis of their deportation was the old statute, the 1924 statute.

Now, the Government must concede and that was the way it conducted the Hintopoulos case, these aliens were deportable under the prior statute.

Now, these proceedings were pending when Congress enacted the 1952 statute and pending on the effective date of the 1952 statute.

Now, under the Government's concept of this position, they would concede, first of all that the old proceedings are valid to deport the Hintopouloses.

They would say however, that if they were not deportable under the old law that 1952, they were to be deportable under the new law, then the old law would not govern but the new law would govern.

That would mean very simply that those proceedings which they're saying on the one hand are valid are not valid any longer and that you could in the middle of the proceedings regard it as no longer valid and as Mr. Fisher said yesterday, in the very same proceedings which they say which the statute says specifically shall continue to have validity.

And as to which the repealed statute shall continue to be enforced that in those proceedings, they could launch a new charge making the Hintopouloses deportable under the new law.

Now that, I submit, does not conform with the meaning or the intent of the savings clause.

It would make the savings clause meaningless.

It would make a complete nullity of Mr. Justice Douglas as suggested by his question, it would completely swallow up.

It would make 241 (d) completely swallow up the savings clause.