International typographical Union, AFL-CIO v. National Labor Relations Board

PETITIONER: International typographical Union, AFL-CIO
RESPONDENT: National Labor Relations Board
LOCATION: Alabama General Assembly

DECIDED BY: Warren Court (1958-1962)
LOWER COURT: United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit

CITATION: 365 US 705 (1961)
ARGUED: Mar 01, 1961
DECIDED: Apr 17, 1961

Facts of the case


Media for International typographical Union, AFL-CIO v. National Labor Relations Board

Audio Transcription for Oral Argument - March 01, 1961 (Part 1) in International typographical Union, AFL-CIO v. National Labor Relations Board

Audio Transcription for Oral Argument - March 01, 1961 (Part 2) in International typographical Union, AFL-CIO v. National Labor Relations Board

Dominick L. Manoli:

-- if the Court please.

When the Court arose, I was addressing myself to the argument that this contract had it been signed, would have contained a provision which prohibited the union from disciplining a foreman for following the written instructions of the employer.

And that this provision would have -- for the safeguard -- the safeguard against the foreman misusing his hiring authority to prefer union members.

I think the short answer to that argument, Your Honor is that under the contract, the employer retained no control with respect to the foreman's exercise of the hiring authority, that he was free to hire -- to exercise that hiring authority to favor union members and there would have been no basis -- no basis since there was no reservation of any right with respect to this -- that matter.

There would have been no basis for the employer to have issued written instructions to the foreman concerning that sort of thing.

Now, this concludes my argument on the foreman clause as a violation of the closed-shop provisions of the statute.

And essentially, as the Court undoubtedly has recognized, our argument with respect to the foreman clause is very much like the argument which underlies our position with respect to the General Savings Clause.

That these provisions create a situation that were foreseeable, the employees will act as though there were closed-shop conditions in effect that they had been put into effect by the parties and that therefore the parties must be held accountable for those foreseeable consequences just as though they have written closed-shop provisions in the agreement.

Before I sit down, however, I do want to address myself to another aspect of this case, an aspect which was not present in the other case because of the posture in which this case arises.

As I said earlier, the employers here did not agree to the proposals.

They resisted and the union went out on strike in support of those demands.

Section 8 (b) (1) (B) of the statute makes it an unfair labor practice for union to restrain or coerce an employer in the choice of representatives for purposes of collective bargaining or the adjustment of grievances.

Now here, the union by virtue of this clause was attempting to restrict the employer's choice with respect to the foreman and the foreman is conceded on all sides.

It would have been management representative for the adjustment of grievances that it's optimistic, the employer's choice of representatives for purposes of grievance to employees who either were union members because that was a necessary qualification of holding the job of foreman, who either were union members or would be -- would be willing to become union members.

Now, we think that this clearly falls within the literal proscription of Section 8 (b) (1) (B) that they were circumscribing the employer's choice of his representatives for purposes of adjusting grievances and as the court below properly held -- properly held this constitutes the violation of that section of the statute.

With respect to the Board's order, I -- I think that the Board's order does not -- does not as suggested here preclude -- preclude the union from incorporating into its contracts, provisions of the General Laws which are valid, and the Board's decisions in these cases have sustained, was well afford adequate guides, adequate guides to the union as to which provisions are to be -- can be included in the contract lawfully, including the contract, and those which may not be.

Thank you.

Earl Warren:

Mr. Van Arkel.

Gerhard P. Van Arkel:

The Court please.

What Mr. Manoli has said with reference to the foreman issue makes it necessary, I think, to review somewhat the actual facts with reference to that matter.

That both Worcester and Haverhill had not been for some years any collective agreement in effect.

The employer by his unilateral choice had a union foreman and he delegated to that union foreman exactly the powers which the contract proposals asked that foreman exercise.

Now, the union's proposals, as I have said, called for nondiscriminatory standards of hiring.

What the union was therefore proposing was that though there had been up to that time a complete delegation of authority to the foreman by the employer's unilateral act, the union was proposing in the contracts which it presented the setting up of nondiscriminatory standards for hire which would be, as I have suggested binding on the employer.

This we say is clearly in aid of the statutory purpose.

There was no effort here at all to influence in any way let alone restrain or coerce the employer in his selection of representative for collective bargaining.

The employers of both Haverhill and Worcester has union foreman.

At Haverhill there was not even an objection to this clause being -- going into the agreement.

And in both cases, therefore, the union made no objection to the foreman of whom the employer then had, and therefore there was no effort to influence let alone restrain or coerce the employer in the selection of his representative to represent him.

Now with respect to the laws clause, the uncertainty argument, there is one additional point which I would like to draw to the Court's attention.