The U. S. foreign policy has since shaped the US policy and world politics for years now. The September 11 terrorist attacks have resulted in extraordinary emphasis of the United States to combat terrorism. As such, there has been an increased urgency of developing new strategies to address the threat and thus become a major challenge for American foreign policy. But the strategy, as critics say, was leading to normalizing war because it was a move toward a more ambitious military objective.
After the atrocities of 11 September, the victims declared a "war on terrorism," targeting not just the suspected perpetrators, but the country in which they are located, and others charged with terrorism worldwide. President Bush pledged to "rid the world of evildoers" and "not let evil stand," echoing Ronald Reagan's denunciation of the "evil scourge of terrorism" in 1985. Here he specifically state-supported international terrorism, which had been declared to be the core issue of US foreign policy as his administration came into office. (New York Times, Oct.
18, 1985). The focal points of the first war on terror were the Middle East and Central America, where Honduras was the major base for US operations. The military component of the re-declared war is led by Donald Rumsfeld, who served as Reagan's special representative to the Middle East; the diplomatic efforts at the UN by John Negroponte, Reagan's Ambassador to Honduras. Washington waged its "war on terrorism" by creating an international terror network of unprecedented scale, and employing it worldwide, with lethal and long-lasting effects.
In Central America, terror guided and supported by the US, reached its most extreme levels in countries where the state security forces themselves were the immediate agents of international terrorism. The effects were reviewed in a 1994 conference organized by Salvadoran Jesuits, whose experiences had been particularly gruesome. (Pico, 1994). The conference report takes particular note of the effects of the residual "culture of terror… in domesticating the expectations of the majority vis-a-vis alternatives different to those of the powerful.
" This is an important observation on the efficacy of state terror. Author Xenias (2005, p. 357) posits “promoting democracy is almost synonymous with promoting peace. ” However, he also mentions that the theory of democratic peace does not take into consideration subcultures and subversive transnational organizations like terrorist groups. It is here where he elucidates Hungtington’s work that demonstrates how democratization occurs in waves, meaning, that backlash is probable, making democratic peace unstable.
This democracy is not permanent at all. Taking that line of reasoning, this will hold true for democratic peace too. Anyway, it does not mean that democratic peace is a loosening of security concerns (Xenias, 2005, p. 381) and that it is important that the inherent divisions in the world show a respect for others. At the heart of this strategy is the new awareness described so well by President Bush: "The gravest danger to freedom now lies at the crossroads of radicalism and technology” (Martin, Gregory, 2003).