Substantive Criminal Law of the judgment

Appellant H. A. Porazzo, Deputy Chief Commander of the California Highway Patrol, appealed the District Court decision to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. Lawson [461 U. S. 352, 355]   cross-appealed, arguing that he was entitled to a jury trial on the issue of damages against the officers. The Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court determination as to the unconstitutionality of 647(e). 658 F. 2d 1362 (1981).

The appellate court determined that the statute was unconstitutional in that it violates the Fourth Amendment's proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures, it contains a vague enforcement standard that is susceptible to arbitrary enforcement, and it fails to give fair and adequate notice of the type of conduct prohibited. Finally, the Court of Appeals reversed the District Court as to its holding that Lawson was not entitled to a jury trial to determine the good faith of the officers in his damages action against them, and remanded the case to the District Court for trial.

The officers appealed to this Court from that portion of the judgment of the Court of Appeals which declared 647(e) unconstitutional and which enjoined its enforcement. We noted probable jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U. S. C. 1254(2). 455 U. S. 999 (1982). In the courts below, Lawson mounted an attack on the facial validity of 647(e). 3 "In evaluating a facial challenge to a state law, a federal court must, of course, consider any limiting construction that a state court or enforcement agency has proffered. " Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc. , 455 U. S. 489, 494 , n. 5 (1982).

As construed by the California Court of Appeal, 4 647(e) requires that an individual [461 U. S. 352, 356]   provide "credible and reliable" identification when requested by a police officer who has reasonable suspicion of criminal activity sufficient to justify a Terry detention. 5 People v. Solomon, 33 Cal. App. 3d 429, 108 Cal. Rptr. 867 [461 U. S. 352, 357]   (1973). "Credible and reliable" identification is defined by the State Court of Appeal as identification "carrying reasonable assurance that the identification is authentic and providing means for later getting in touch with the person who has identified himself.

" Id. , at 438, 108 Cal. Rptr. , at 873. In addition, a suspect may be required to "account for his presence . . . to the extent that it assists in producing credible and reliable identification . . . ." Id. , at 438, 108 Cal. Rptr. , at 872. Under the terms of the statute, failure of the individual to provide "credible and reliable" identification permits the arrest. 6 Our Constitution is designed to maximize individual freedoms within a framework of ordered liberty. Statutory limitations on those freedoms are examined for substantive authority and content as well as for definiteness or certainty of expression.

See generally M. Bassiouni, Substantive Criminal Law 53 (1978). As generally stated, the void-for-vagueness doctrine requires that a penal statute define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc. , supra; Smith v. Goguen, 415 U. S. 566 (1974); Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U. S. 104 (1972); Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U. S. 156 (1972); Connally v. General Construction Co. , 269 U. S.

385 (1926). Although the doctrine focuses [461 U. S. 352, 358]   both on actual notice to citizens and arbitrary enforcement, we have recognized recently that the more important aspect of the vagueness doctrine "is not actual notice, but the other principal element of the doctrine – the requirement that a legislature establish minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement. " Smith, 415 U. S. , at 574 . Where the legislature fails to provide such minimal guidelines, a criminal statute may permit "a standardless sweep [that] allows policemen, prosecutors, and juries to pursue their personal predilections.

" Id. , at 575. 7 Section 647(e), as presently drafted and as construed by the state courts, contains no standard for determining what a suspect has to do in order to satisfy the requirement to provide a "credible and reliable" identification. As such, the statute vests virtually complete discretion in the hands of the police to determine whether the suspect has satisfied the statute and must be permitted to go on his way in the absence of probable cause to arrest.

An individual, whom police may think is suspicious but do not have probable cause to believe has committed a crime, is entitled to continue to walk the public streets "only at the whim of any police officer" who happens to stop that individual under 647(e). Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 382 U. S. 87, 90 (1965). Our concern here is based upon the "potential for arbitrarily suppressing First Amendment liberties . . . ." Id. , at 91. In addition, 647(e) implicates consideration of the constitutional right to freedom of movement. See Kent v. Dulles, 357 U. S. 116, 126 (1958); Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U. S.

500, 505 -506 (1964). 8   [461 U. S. 352, 359] Section 647(e) is not simply a "stop-and-identify" statute. Rather, the statute requires that the individual provide a "credible and reliable" identification that carries a "reasonable assurance" of its authenticity, and that provides "means for later getting in touch with the person who has identified himself. " Solomon, 33 Cal. App. 3d, at 438, 108 Cal. Rptr. , at 872-873. In addition, the suspect may also have to account for his presence "to the extent it assists in producing [461 U. S. 352, 360]   credible and reliable identification. " Id. , at 438, 108 Cal. Rptr. , at 872.