Dissension among judges on a case may help achieved a more objective and fair decisions on a particular case. Dissension should be focused serving the law by raising issues and theories that may properly control the case. In the case R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Company; Lorillard Tobacco Company; and R. J. Reynolds Smoke Shop, Inc. v. Sandra Shewry and Dileep G.
Bal of the state of California Department of Health Services, the judges of the United States court Eastern California District correctly interpreted the provisions of the First Amendments alleged by the tobacco companies to have been violated by the California Department of health services in their television advertisement targeting the tobacco of tobacco as health hazards. According to the merits of the case, the tobacco companies sought both injunctive and declaratory reliefs by filing five causes of actions against the dependants.
The tobacco companies argued that the surtax or the excise tax of 25 cent-per pack tax on all whole sale cigarette sales in California was used to fund advertisements that are in effect anti “industry. ” However, the judges noted the purpose of the Proposition 99 also known as the “Tobacco Tax and Health Protection Act of 1988” which enforces the Cigarette and Tobacco Surtax that twenty percent of this money is allocated for “Health Education Account” wherein funds can only be appropriated for programs designed for the prevention and reduction of tobacco use, particularly among children “through school and community education program.
” The judges also noted that each of the television advertisement held by the tobacco companies to have been purportedly violating the First Amendment and is directed against them were all supposed to be funded by the surtax, thus, the arguments is, the money raised from an excise tax that targets the tobacco industry was used to pay advertising that disparage the industry violate their rights.
In interpreting the provisions of the First Amendments the judges cited the case of the United Foods in which they uphold the right of the tobacco industry to object to the television advertisements at issue in view of their payment of surtax which forms a “special subsidies” for the advertisements that disproportionately affects them.
However, the court ruled that the First Amendments prohibiting the government from compelling citizens to express beliefs that they do not hold, and the right of freedom of thought which protects citizens against state actions, does not apply in the case for the reason that there is no assumption that the tobacco companies were coerced into expressing any position. On the other hand the court cited a precedent in Abood v. Detroit of Education, 431 U. S. 209, 52 L. Ed. 2d 261, 97 S. Ct.
1782 (1977) involving a challenge by public school teachers to a collective bargaining agreement. Under this case, non-union members were required to pay a fee which is equivalent to union dues. When some portions of this service fee were used for political and ideological purposes which are outside of the collective bargaining, the court held that the program violated the principle that the individual freedom to join together for the purpose advancing beliefs and ideas is covered by the First Amendment.
In effect, while the union could oblige objectors to contribute funds that were “germane” to its duties, it would violate the essential principles of freedom of association to require the monetary contribution of objectors for ideological purposes not related to collective bargaining. Citing at once the United Foods, the court is right in its emphasis that nothing in this precedent case suggests that the compelled speech applies to situations where the government collects tax on private individual and then uses the money to speak in behalf of the government.
The court’s ruling that “valid tax for an otherwise valid purpose normally must bind even those who oppose to the government’s objective. ” In connection to this, the court’s elucidations that the government as a general rule may sustain legitimate programs and policies by taxes or other forms of taxation binding on protesting parties are justifiable and applicable to the case in point.
The implication of this court’s view is that the provision of the First Amendment as cited in the case Abood and Keller concerning the protecting freedom of expression does not apply to government as both an authority in taxation and as a speaker. Thus, apparently, judges rightly and justifiably rendered a fair decision based on careful scrutiny of facts, statutes, and precedents that were related to the case.
Their decision to dismiss the case against the California Department of Health Services was obviously based on objective assessment of the arguments presented by both sides and on the merits of the precedents cited in the case. The judges apparently held a highly non partisan opinions and conclusions on specific fact and issues that might be favorable to the government given the efforts of the government to reduce the use of tobacco as well as the public reaction on the health impact of tobacco use.
The Judges’ decisions were obviously not influence by these pressures as they stood on their ground to base their judgment on the merits of the arguments and facts presented. The Court of Appeals affirmed that the state can “compel unwilling citizens and private entities openly and exclusively to contribute and to pay for a public interest message that disagree and which puts them public disparagement, disgrace, and even hatred.
The decision therefore of the court of appeals to affirm the lower court’s judgment on the case proves the court integrity, impartiality, and objectivity. Work Cited Dissent-Circuit Judge Trott LexisNexis R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Company; Lorillard Tobacco Company R. J Reynolds Smoke Shop v. Sandra Shewry Dileep G. Bal of California Department of Health Services Simulation # 4 Government imposition of Completed Speech