Nine years after the first U. S. drone strike in Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) in 2004, the U. S. refuses to officially acknowledge the CIA-run program, while Pakistan denies consenting to it. This secrecy undermines efforts to assess the program’s legality or its full impact on FATA’s population. It also diverts attention from a candid examination of the roots of militancy in the poorly governed tribal belt bordering southern and eastern Afghanistan and how best to address them.
Drone strikes may disrupt FATA-based militant groups’ capacity to plan and execute cross-border attacks on NATO troops and to plot attacks against the U. S. homeland, but they cannot solve the fundamental problem. The ability of those groups to regroup, rearm and recruit will remain intact so long as they enjoy safe havens on Pakistani territory and efforts to incorporate FATA into the constitutional mainstream are stifled. Since 2004, there have been at least 350 drone strikes in FATA, mostly in North Waziristan, South Waziristan and Kurram agencies.
These have killed significant numbers of al-Qaeda leaders and senior militant commanders of both the Pakistani and Afghan Taliban, but also scores of innocent civilians, in part because of so-called “signature” strikes that target groups of men based on behaviour patterns associated with terrorist activity rather than known identities. Even with so-called “personality” strikes in which the individual has been targeted based on evidence of identity, accurate assessments of collateral damage are impossible.
Independent researchers, facing significant military and militant-imposed barriers to access in FATA, rely primarily on media reports that depend largely on anonymous U. S. government and/or Pakistani military sources – each with a vested interest in under- or over-reporting civilian casualties. Neither is it possible to gauge the real feelings of civilians who live in the areas of drone operations. Fearing retaliation from the militants or the military, respondents choose their words carefully.
For the same reasons, it is hard to determine with any precision the strategic impact of the drone campaign. While reported signature strikes may in particular fuel local alienation, at the same time, the deaths of senior, highly experienced commanders are certainly a hard blow for the militants. Pakistan’s attitude towards drones borders on the schizophrenic. Rather than inherently opposing the strikes, its leadership, in particular its military, seeks greater control over target selection. This is often to
punish enemies, but sometimes, allegedly, to protect militants who enjoy good relations with, or support from, the military – leaders of the Haqqani network, for example, or some Pakistani Taliban groups with whom the military has made peace deals. Ample evidence exists of tacit Pakistani consent and active cooperation with the drone program, contradicting the official posture that it violates the country’s sovereignty. This includes acknowledgements by former President Pervez Musharraf in April 2013 and by then-Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani in 2008 and 2010.
After the October 2001 U. S. -led intervention in Afghanistan, Musharraf’s military regime permitted a substantial CIA presence in at least two airbases, Shamsi in southern Balochistan and Shahbaz in Sindh’s Jacobabad district, for intelligence gathering and collaboration; both were used to gather intelligence for drone strikes and possi- Drones: Myths and Reality in Pakistan Crisis Group Asia Report N°247, 21 May 2013 Page ii bly even to conduct them. This cooperation and collaboration signified Pakistan’s assent to the program.
It was not until the November 2011 NATO air raid that killed 24 Pakistani soldiers near the Afghan border and months after the U. S. raid that killed Osama bin Laden in Abbottabad, vitiating relations with Washington, that Islamabad demanded the U. S. vacate one of the bases. While drones have not themselves caused the political falling out between Washington and Islamabad, the Pakistani military has attempted to take advantage of downturns in the relationship to leverage greater control over drone targets.
Even after the U. S. vacated the Shamsi base in December 2011, some level of Pakistani sanction for the strikes continues. While condemning attacks against its anti-Afghanistanoriented jihadi allies, such as the August 2012 killing of Badruddin Haqqani, the Haqqani network’s third in command, it supports strikes against its internal enemies, such as Maulvi Dadullah, the leader of the Pakistani Taliban in Bajaur Agency, killed in a drone strike in Afghanistan’s Kunar province that same month.
The U. S. hit list now reportedly includes Mullah Fazlullah, the leader of a Pakistani Taliban faction in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa’s (KPK’s) Malakand region, ousted in a military operation in 2009, and now operating out of Afghanistan’s Nuristan province. The legal debate does not pivot only on Pakistani consent. Both countries are subject to numerous obligations under international law and their respective domestic legislation.
Islamabad has a constitutional and international obligation to protect the lives of citizens and non-citizens alike on its territory. Even if it seeks U. S. assistance against individuals and groups at war with the state, Pakistan is still obliged to ensure that its actions and those of the U. S. comply with the principles, among others, of distinction and proportionality under International Humanitarian Law, and ideally to give independent observers unhindered access to the areas targeted.
The Obama administration should terminate any practice, such as the reported signature strikes, that does not comply with principles of international humanitarian and human rights law. It must also introduce transparency to the drone program, including its governing rules, how targets are selected and how civilian damage is weighed. By transferring its management from the CIA to the Defense Department, the administration would establish clearer lines of authority and accountability, including greater congressional and judicial oversight.
Distorted through hyper-nationalistic segments of the Pakistani media and hijacked by political hardliners, the domestic Pakistani debate on the impact of drone operations has overshadowed a more urgent discussion about the state’s obligation to its citizens in FATA, who are denied constitutional rights and protections. In the absence of formal courts and law enforcement institutions, the state fails to protect FATA’s residents from jihadi and other criminal groups. The core of any Pakistani counter-terrorism strategy in this area should be to incorporate FATA into the country’s legal and constitutional mainstream.
This should be accompanied by a national counter-terrorism policy that prioritises the modernisation of a failing criminal justice sector, thus enabling the state to bring violent extremists to justice. While the U. S. and international debate over legitimacy and control of drone strikes is highly important, drones are not a long-term solution to the problem they are being deployed to solve – destruction of local, regional and wider transnational jihadis who operate out of Pakistan’s tribal belt.
Drones: Myths and Reality in Pakistan Crisis Group Asia Report N°247, 21 May 2013 Page iii The U. S. policy should be two-fold: pressuring the Pakistan military to abandon any logistical or other support to violent extremists, including by more rigorously applying existing conditions on security assistance; and encouraging and supporting efforts by the elected leadership in Islamabad to extend the state’s writ to FATA. Similarly, if Pakistan is genuinely committed to ending strikes on its territory, it should realise that its strongest case against the U. S.
drone program lies in overhauling an anachronistic governance system so as to establish fundamental constitutional rights and genuine political enfranchisement in FATA, along with a state apparatus capable of upholding the rule of law and bringing violent extremists to justice. Drones: Myths and Reality in Pakistan Crisis Group Asia Report N°247, 21 May 2013 Page iv Recommendations To introduce transparency to the U. S. drone program in Pakistan and ensure it is consistent with key principles of International Humanitarian and Human Rights Law To the Federal Government of Pakistan: 1.
Enable independent assessment of drone strike casualties and impact on FATA by: a) lifting all travel and other restrictions on independent observers, national and foreign, to the targeted areas in FATA; and b) conditioning any ongoing consent of drone strikes on the institution of transparent U. S. policies and practices that respect international humanitarian law principles of humanity, distinction, proportionality and military necessity, and ending any active or tacit support should the U. S. program violate those principles.
To the U. S. Government: 2. Demonstrate respect for the international humanitarian law principles of humanity, distinction, proportionality and military necessity, including by: a) halting reported signature strikes that target groups of men based on behaviour patterns that may be associated with terrorist activity rather than known identities; and b) ending the reported practice of counting all military-aged men in a strike zone as combatants unless sufficient evidence proves them innocent posthumously. 3.
Develop a rigorous legal framework for the use of drones that defines clear roles for the executive, legislative and judicial branches and introduces a meaningful level of regular judicial and congressional oversight. 4. Convert the drone program from a covert CIA operation to a military-run program overseen by the Defense Department, with oversight by the Senate and House Armed Services Committees and appropriate judicial review. To bolster the Pakistani civilian government’s ability to protect its citizens and bring violent extremists to justice To the Federal Government of Pakistan: 5.
Ensure that the federal cabinet takes the lead in formulating comprehensive, nationwide and civilian-led counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency policies, centred on enhancing rule-of-law institutions, with input from and oversight by the legislature, particularly the parliamentary committee on national security and the Senate committee on defence and defence production. 6. Make the extension of the state’s writ in FATA the centrepiece of the counterterrorism agenda by: a) extending the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and Peshawar High Court to FATA, as authorised by Article 247 of the constitution;
Drones: Myths and Reality in Pakistan Crisis Group Asia Report N°247, 21 May 2013 Page v b) abolishing the FATA secretariat, established by the Musharraf military regime in 2006, and returning its responsibilities to the relevant Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province (KPK) line ministries; c) incorporating FATA into the constitutional mainstream, abolishing the Frontier Crimes Regulations (FCR, 1901) and replacing it by the Pakistan Penal Code, Criminal Procedure Code and Evidence Act.
d) replacing tribal jirgas (councils of elders) with district and sub-district courts, manned by judges, and extending the jurisdiction of the KPK police to FATA; e) repealing the Actions (in Aid of Civil Power) Regulations 2011 for FATA; and f) enhancing border management cooperation with Afghanistan to contain and prevent militant cross border movement. 7. Establish clear guidelines for remedial action if and when innocent civilians are injured or killed, whether by U. S. drones or the Pakistani military, and create a compensation fund for such victims. To the U. S. Government: 8.
Implement existing conditions on military aid if the Pakistan military or elements within it do not take concrete steps to end support to the Haqqani network, the Quetta Shura, the Lashkar-e-Tayyaba and other extremist groups, including factions of the Pakistani Taliban; and consider as a last resort imposing targeted and incremental sanctions, including travel and visa bans and the freezing of financial assets of key military leaders and military-controlled intelligence agencies responsible for supporting extremist elements that plan and conduct attacks from Pakistani territory against its neighbourhood and beyond.
9. Shift the priority of security assistance to making Pakistan a strong criminal justice partner by supporting the modernisation and enhancing the counter-terrorism capacity of the police and civilian law enforcement agencies. 10. Condition FATA aid on tangible steps by Pakistan’s federal government to extend the state’s writ in the tribal belt and implement political reforms – including by abolishing the FATA secretariat and returning its responsibilities to KPK line ministries and instituting an effective law enforcement apparatus – and then provide technical, financial and other support to that new system.
Islamabad/Washington/Brussels, 21 May 2013 International Crisis Group Asia Report N°247 21 May 2013 Drones: Myths and Reality in Pakistan I. Introduction When the drone program began in 2004 to target militants in Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA),1 the Pakistani military was allowing the U. S. use of at least two major airbases, Shamsi in southern Balochistan and Shahbaz in Sindh’s Jacobabad district. These were allegedly also used by the CIA both to collect intelligence and conduct drone strikes.
2 After the November 2011 NATO attack that killed 24 Pakistani soldiers at a checkpost in FATA’s Mohmand Agency near the Afghan border, Pakistan demanded that the U. S. vacate Shamsi, which it did in December 2011. 3 That same month, Pakistan’s defence ministry declared that the Shahbaz base was under the air force’s control. 4 Whether the U. S. completely evacuated Shahbaz remains unclear. 5 An April 2012 National Assembly non-binding resolution called for an immediate cessation of drone strikes on Pakistani territory.
6 Given the covert nature of program, it is difficult to determine the extent of continued Pakistani tacit consent or active cooperation. Militant groups, understandably the strongest opponents of the drone program, still hold the state responsible. On 2 February 2013, for example, militants attacked a military checkpost in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa’s (KPK’s) Lakki Marwat district, adjacent to FATA’s South Waziristan Agency, killing 24 people. Claiming credit, the Pakistani Taliban said the attack was meant as retaliation against Pakistani cooperation in the CIA-run program.
7 It is equally difficult to gauge the impact of drone strikes. Both the military and militants have obstructed access to independent observers in South Waziristan, North Waziristan and Kurram agencies, where most strikes have been conducted. 8 The drones’ impact on the ground, including the number of militants and civilians killed, and the long-term impact on FATA’s tribal society is therefore difficult to assess. This report examines the impact of the drone program in FATA within the context of broader challenges in Pakistan-U. S.
relations, civil-military relations in Pakistan For analysis of militancy in FATA, see Crisis Group Asia Reports N°178, Pakistan: Countering Militancy in FATA, 21 October 2009; N°164, Pakistan: The Militant Jihadi Challenge, 13 March 2009; and N°125, Pakistan’s Tribal Areas: Appeasing the Militants, 11 December 2006. FATA is comprised of seven administrative units, or agencies, including Bajaur, Mohmand, Khyber, Kurram, Orakzai, North Waziristan and South Waziristan, and parts of four KPK districts known as Frontier Regions. 2 Chris Woods, “CIA drones quit one Pakistani site – but U. S.
keeps access to other airbases”, The Bureau of Investigative Journalism (TBIJ), 15 December 2011. TBIJ is an independent not-forprofit organisation based at City University, London. 3 “U. S. vacating Shamsi air base, says Cameron Munter”, Dawn, 5 December 2011. 4 “Shahbaz base under PAF control”, The Nation, 2 December 2011. 5 Woods, op. cit. 6 Pakistan’s bicameral parliament is composed of the National Assembly, the directly-elected lower house, and the Senate, the indirectly-elected upper house. 7 “Vengeful Taliban: Brazen attack on security forces in Lakki Marwat”, The Express Tribune, 3 February 2013.
8 There are stringent travel restrictions for foreigners in FATA, as well as curbs on the movements and activities of citizens who are non-residents. 1 Drones: Myths and Reality in Pakistan Crisis Group Asia Report N°247, 21 May 2013 Page 2 and governance and security in FATA. It is based primarily on interviews in Pakistan with stakeholders in the legal, political and NGO communities, as well as activists, journalists and researchers working on FATA, and includes an extensive review of the literature on the legality of the drone program. Drones: Myths and Reality in Pakistan Crisis Group Asia Report N°247, 21 May 2013
Page 3 II. A. Challenging Conventional Wisdom The Sovereignty Question Washington and Islamabad have no official agreement regarding U. S. drone strikes on Pakistani territory, and the Pakistan government often denounces strikes as violation of both the country’s sovereignty and international law. 9 At the same time, Islamabad has repeatedly demanded greater control over the use of drones, if not direct responsibility then a right to agree on targets,10 thus implying more a desire to acquire greater decision-making authority over the program than to see it end.
According to a U. S. diplomatic cable released by WikiLeaks, in a May 2009 meeting with a U. S. congressional delegation led by Senator Patrick Leahy, chairman of the Appropriations Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations and Related Programs, President Asif Ali Zardari reportedly said, “give me the drones so my forces can take out the militants [so that] we cannot be criticised by the media or anyone else for actions our Army takes to protect our sovereignty”. 11 There is ample evidence of the Pakistani authorities’ tacit consent and even active cooperation with U.
S. officials since the start of the drone program in 2004. In 2008, and again in 2010, then-Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani disclosed that General Pervez Musharraf’s government had authorised the U. S. to use drones to carry out reconnaissance and surveillance over Pakistani airspace. 12 In the first public acknowledgement of far more active Pakistani participation in the CIA-run program, Musharraf himself admitted during a media interview in April 2013 that his government had secretly signed off on U. S.
drone strikes. 13 It had even taken credit for the killing of Pakistani Taliban leader Nek Muhammed in the CIA’s first drone strike on 16 June 2004, claiming that it was a Pakistani missile strike. 14 Musharraf allowed a substantial CIA presence in at least two airbases, Shamsi in southern Balochistan and Shahbaz in Sindh’s Jacobabad district, for intelligence gathering and, possibly, to launch some of the drone attacks. 15 The military’s claims 9 On 5 February 2013, for example, Pakistan’s ambassador to the U. S.
, Sherry Rehman, described drone strikes as “a clear violation of our sovereignty and a violation of international law”, straining relations between Islamabad and Washington. Karen DeYoung, “Pakistan ambassador to U. S. calls CIA drone strikes a ‘clear violation’”, The Washington Post, 5 February 2013. 10 For example, during an October 2012 visit to Washington, Interior Minister Rehman Malik told U. S. Secretary of Homeland Security Janet Napolitano: “If we are given drones, we will use them responsibly as we used the [U. S. -supplied] F-16s”.
Anwar Iqbal, “Drones will be used responsibly, Pakistan assures U. S. ”, Dawn, 8 October 2012. See also “CODEL Leahy meets President Zardari”, U. S. Embassy Islamabad cable, 26 May 2009, as made public by WikiLeaks and cited in Hasan Zaidi, “Army chief wanted more drone support”, Dawn, 20 May 2011. 11 “CODEL Leahy meets President Zardari”, op. cit. 12 “Musharraf approved US reconnaissance drones: PM Gilani”, The Express Tribune, 2 October 2010. 13 Citing “a very fluid situation, a vicious enemy … mountains, inaccessible areas” as justification for cooperating with the U. S.
drone program, Musharraf disclosed that strikes were secretly approved if “there was no time for our own military to act”, and “you couldn’t delay action”. Nic Robertson and Greg Botelho, “Ex-Pakistani President Musharraf admits secret deal with U. S. on drone strikes”, CNN, 12 April 2013. 14 Ismail Khan and Dilawar Khan Wazir, “Night raid kills Nek, four other militants: Wana operation”, Dawn, 18 June 2004; and Brian Glyn Williams, “The CIA’s Covert Predator Drone War in Pakistan”, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, vol. 32, no. 10 (2010), pp. 874-875. 15 Woods, op. cit.
Drones: Myths and Reality in Pakistan Crisis Group Asia Report N°247, 21 May 2013 Page 4 that Shamsi was run by the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and not by Pakistan, and therefore the Pakistani armed forces had no say in the U. S. presence, was a political fig leaf to conceal the actual high level of cooperation. 16 Army chief General Ashfaq Pervez Kayani, head of the Inter-Services Intelligence directorate (ISI) from October 2004 to October 2007, likely played a central role in shaping intelligence cooperation during and even after the fall of Musharraf’s regime. 17 Classified cables of the U.
S. embassy in Islamabad, released by WikiLeaks in 2010, show that Pakistan’s civil and military leadership had actively supported drone operations. Thus in January 2008, less than a month before presidential elections, General Kayani asked the U. S. to provide drone coverage of parts of South Waziristan. 18 In August 2008, Prime Minister Gilani, brushing aside Interior Minister Rehman Malik’s suggestion that the U. S. hold off on drone strikes during the Pakistani military operation in FATA’s Bajaur Agency, reportedly said, “I don’t care if they do it as long as they get the right people.
We’ll protest in the National Assembly and then ignore it”. 19 The military, which continued to control security and defence policy after the civilian government was sworn in, provided far more than verbal support for the drone operations. In 2009, a U. S. embassy cable disclosed that the U. S. started embedding special forces with Pakistani soldiers in FATA’s North and South Waziristan agencies to coordinate, among other forms of cooperation, drone strikes. 20 Information sharing apparently included monthly notifications to the ISI by the CIA, indicating the boundaries of airspace that drones would use, until the May 2011 U.
S. raid in KPK’s Abbottabad district that led to Osama bin Laden’s killing. The ISI acknowledged receipt of the notifications, implying consent. 21 The U. S. continued to use the Shamsi airbase throughout 2011. The CIA, however, reportedly stopped launching drones from the base in April 2011, following the killing of two people in Lahore by CIA operative Raymond Davis earlier that year. 22 After the Abbottabad raid, some Pakistani officials, including then-Defence Minister Ahmed Mukhtar, demanded that the U. S.
vacate Shamsi, but the government only formally asked Washington to leave the base at the end of November 2011, following the NATO strike on the Salalah checkpost in FATA’s Mohmand Agency, bordering “‘Shamsi airbase not under PAF control’”, The Express Tribune, 14 May 2011. Crisis Group interview, Ahmed Rashid, author and journalist, Lahore, 21 January 2013. The ISI and Military Intelligence (MI) are Pakistan’s main military-run or controlled intelligence agencies. 18 The cable is unclear on whether his request was limited to surveillance or included strikes. “Admiral Fallon discusses security cooperation with General Kayani”, U. S.
Embassy Islamabad cable, 11 February 2008, as made public by WikiLeaks and cited in Zaidi, op. cit. 19 “Immunity for Musharraf likely after Zardari’s election as president”, U. S. Embassy Islamabad cable, 23 August 2008, as made public by WikiLeaks and cited in Declan Walsh, “WikiLeaks cables: US special forces working inside Pakistan”, The Guardian, 30 November 2010. 20 “Pakistan army GHQ again approves embedding U. S. special forces personnel to support military operations”, U. S. Embassy Islamabad cable, 9 October 2009, as made public by WikiLeaks and cited in ibid. Also, Tim Lister, “WikiLeaks: Pakistan quietly approved drones strikes, U.
S. special units”, CNN, 1 December 2010. 21 Adam Entous, Siobhan Gorman and Evan Perez, “U. S. unease over drone strikes”, The Wall Street Journal, 26 September 2012. 22 Karen DeYoung, “CIA idles drone flights from base in Pakistan”, The Washington Post, 1 July 2011. 17 16 Drones: Myths and Reality in Pakistan Crisis Group Asia Report N°247, 21 May 2013 Page 5 on Afghanistan. 23 That implied only a partial retraction of informal Pakistani consent and cooperation, since the U. S. reportedly maintains a presence at the Shahbaz base. 24 Many Pakistani political leaders certainly oppose the U.
S. targeting of Pakistani citizens and are frustrated by their government’s inability to respond. Then-National Assembly deputy speaker, Faisal Karim Kundi, whose constituency borders on FATA’s South Waziristan Agency, said, “not a single political party supports drones. But what can we do aside from ordering our air force to shoot them down? This would mean declaring war on a superpower”. 25 It is, however, the Pakistani military that shapes the political leadership’s response, through a variety of means, including briefings given to parliament by the army chief and ISI director general.
26 As relations between the military and the U. S. deteriorated after the events of 2011, the National Assembly passed a non-binding resolution in April 2012, reviewing relations with Washington and calling for the immediate cessation of drone strikes. The resolution stated: “Pakistan’s sovereignty shall not be compromised …. The relationship with U. S. A. should be based on mutual respect for the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of each other”. 27 Yet, Pakistan’s stance on drones remains ambiguous. Almost nine years after the U.
S. conducted its first drone strike in FATA, Pakistan has yet to lodge a formal complaint to the UN Security Council. It also continues to clear airspace for the drones, which the Obama administration interprets as tacit consent. 28 In September 2012, then-Foreign Minister Hina Rabbani Khar said, “the use of unilateral strikes on Pakistani territory is illegal”. But while condemning unilateral strikes, Khar also expressed her government’s support for the drone program’s aim: “What the drones are trying to achieve, we may not disagree.
If they’re going for terrorists, we do not disagree. But we have to find ways which are lawful, which are legal”. 29 While intelligence sharing declined in 2011 and 2012, meetings between U. S. and Pakistan officials on the drone operations continued. Visiting Pakistan a month after the Abbottabad raid, CIA Director Leon Panetta “was particularly forceful about trying to get Pakistani officials to allow armed drones to fly over even wider areas in the northwest tribal regions”. 30 ISI chief General Zaheerul Islam’s visit to the U.
S. in July 2012 was reportedly aimed at seeking “direct control of predators [drones] for precision strikes and for minimising their political fallout”. 31 It is thus amply clear that the military does not oppose drones, but seeks control over their use, or at least to leverage the debate to obtain more say over target selection. “Notices sent to vacate Shamsi Airbase: Malik”, The Express Tribune, 29 November 2011. Also, “Shamsi base is nice but not crucial for drone attacks”, The Express Tribune, 29 November 2011.
24 Woods, op. cit. 25 Crisis Group interview, Islamabad, 1 February 2013. 26 In October 2011, for instance, Army chief General Kayani briefed parliamentary committees on Pakistan’s relations with the U. S. in-camera, telling the political leadership that it was their duty to develop a consensus on drone strikes. A month later, the National Assembly passed a resolution condemning the strikes. Sikander Shaheen, “Army to toe parliament’s line”, The Nation, 19 October 2011.
27 “Resolution on guidelines for terms of engagement with USA/NATO/ISAF and general foreign policy (resolution #53)”, National Assembly of Pakistan, 12 April 2012, p. 1. 28 Entous, Gorman and Perez, op. cit. 29 “Pakistan backs drones’ aim not method: Minister”, The Express Tribune, 28 September 2012. 30 Eric Schmitt and Mark Mazzetti, “Pakistan arrests C. I. A. informants in Bin Laden raid”, The New York Times, 14 June 2011. 31 “Spymaster to ‘talk tough’ on drones”, The Nation, 19 July 2012. 23 Drones: Myths and Reality in Pakistan Crisis Group Asia Report N°247, 21 May 2013