Doctrines and Principles in Remedial Law

Doctrine of non-interference or doctrine of judicial stability Courts of equal and coordinate jurisdiction cannot interfere with each other‘sorders. Thus, the RTC has no power to nullify or enjoin the enforcement of a writ of possession issued by another RTC. The principle also bars a court from reviewing or interfering with the judgment of a co-equal court over which it has no appellate jurisdiction or power of review.

This doctrine applies with equal force to administrative bodies. When the law provides for an appeal from the decision of an administrative body to the SC or CA, it means that such body is coequal with the RTC in terms of rand  and stature, and logically beyond the control of the latter.

Doctrine of primary jurisdiction

Courts will not resolve a controversy involving a question which is within the jurisdiction of an administrative tribunal, especially where the question demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience and services of the administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of fact.

The objective is to guide a court in determining whether it should refrain from exercising its jurisdiction until after an administrative agency has determined some question or some aspect of some question arising in the proceeding before the court (Omictin vs. CA, GR 148004, January 22, 2007).

Doctrine of adherence of jurisdiction/continuity of jurisdiction In view of the principle that once a court has acquired jurisdiction, that jurisdiction continues until the court has done all that it can do in the exercise of that jurisdiction. This principle also means that once jurisdiction

has attached, it cannot be ousted by subsequent happenings or events, although of a character which would have prevented jurisdiction from attaching in the first instance. The court, once jurisdiction has been acquired, retains that jurisdiction until it finally disposes of the case. Even the finality of the judgment does not totally deprive the court of jurisdiction over the case.

What the court loses is the power to amend, modify or alter the judgment. Even after the judgment has become final, the court retains jurisdiction to enforce and execute it (Echegaray vs. Secretary  of Justice, 301 SCRA 96).

Neypes doctrine If the motion is denied, the movants has a fresh period of 15 days from receipt or notice of the order denying or dismissing the motion for reconsideration within which to file a notice to appeal. This new period becomes significant if either a motion for reconsideration or a motion for new trial has been filed but was denied or dismissed.

This fresh period rule applies only to Rule 41governing appeals from the RTC but also to Rule 40 governing appeals from MTC to RTC, Rule 42 on petitions for review from the RTC to the CA, Rule 43 on appeal from quasi-judicial agencies to the CA, and Rule 45 governing appeals by certiorari to the SC.

Accordingly, this rule was adopted to standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules to afford fair opportunity to review the case and, in the process, minimize errors of judgment. Obviously, the new 15 day period may be availed of only if either motion is filed; otherwise, the decision becomes final and executory after the lapse of the original appeal period provided in Rule 41 (Neypes vs. CA, GR 141524, Sept. 14, 2005). The Neypes ruling shall not be applied where no motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration has been filed in which case the 15-day period shall run from notice of the judgment.

The fresh period rule does not refer to the period within which to appeal from the order denying the motion for new trial because the order is not appealable under Sec. 9, Rule 37. The nonappealability of the order of  denial is also confirmed by Sec. 1(a), Rule 41, which provides that no  appeal may be taken from an order denying a motion for new trial or a motion for reconsideration