Stop the Beach Renourishment Inc. v. Florida Department of Environmental Protection

PETITIONER: Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc.
RESPONDENT: Florida Department of Environmental Protection, et al.
LOCATION: Supreme Court of Florida

DOCKET NO.: 08-1151
DECIDED BY: Roberts Court (2009-2010)
LOWER COURT: Florida Supreme Court

CITATION: 560 US 702 (2010)
GRANTED: Jun 15, 2009
ARGUED: Dec 02, 2009
DECIDED: Jun 17, 2010

ADVOCATES:
D. Kent Safriet - for the petitioner
Edwin S. Kneedler - Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the respondents
Petitioner Scott D Makar - Solicitor General of Florida, for the respondents

Facts of the case

In 1961, Florida enacted the Beach and Shore Preservation Act ("BSPA") to restore and maintain critically eroded beaches within the state. In 2003, under the BSPA, the Florida Department of Environmental Protection filed for an Application for a Joint Coastal Permit and Authorization to Use Sovereign Submerged Lands in order to dredge sand from a shoal to rebuild a beach. Stop the Beach Renourishment Inc. ("SBR"), an association of homeowners, subsequently challenged the issuance of the permit and the constitutionality of the BSPA. The Florida court of appeals rescinded the permit, holding that issuance would have resulted in an unconstitutional taking.

On appeal, the Supreme Court of Florida first rephrased the certified question to determine whether the BSPA was "on its face" constitutional. Then, the court held that the BSPA was not unconstitutional, reasoning that it did not deprive land owners of littoral rights without just compensation.

Question

By reversing longstanding holdings that littoral (i.e., on or near the shore) rights are constitutionally protected, did the Florida Supreme Court cause a "judicial taking" proscribed by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments?

Media for Stop the Beach Renourishment Inc. v. Florida Department of Environmental Protection

Audio Transcription for Oral Argument - December 02, 2009 in Stop the Beach Renourishment Inc. v. Florida Department of Environmental Protection

Audio Transcription for Opinion Announcement - June 17, 2010 in Stop the Beach Renourishment Inc. v. Florida Department of Environmental Protection

John G. Roberts, Jr.:

Justice Scalia has the opinion of the Court in case 081151, Stop The Beach Renourishment Inc. versus the Florida Department of Environmental Protection.

He has asked that I announce the opinion for him.

In this case, on writ of certiorari from the Supreme Court of Florida, we deal with complicated facts and the summary that follows leaves out some minor details.

Under Florida law, the State owns in trust for the public land permanently submerged beneath navigable waters and the land between the low-tide line and the mean high-water line.

Thus the mean high-water line is the ordinary boundary between private beachfront or littoral property and state-owned land.

Littoral owners have certain rights that include as relevant here, the right to ownership of the accretions to their littoral property.

An accretion is in addition to shore property that occurs gradually and imperceptibly.

An addition created by a sudden change such as a hurricane is called an avulsion and does not belong to the littoral owner, when an avulsion occurs the seaward boundary of littoral property remains what it was, the mean high-water line before the event.

Thus, when an avulsion has added new land, the littoral owner no longer owns oceanfront and any later accretions to the new land belong to the owner of the seabed which is ordinarily the State.

Florida's Beach and Shore Preservation Act establishes procedures for restoration projects, that consists of depositing sand on eroded beaches.

When such a project is undertaken, the respondent, Board of Trustees of the internal improvement trust fund which holds title to the seabed sets a fixed “erosion control line” to replace the fluctuating mean high-water line as the boundary between littoral property and state property.

Once the new line is recorded, the common law ceases to apply.

Thereafter, when accretion moves the mean high-water line seaward, the littoral property remains bounded by the permanent erosion-control line and is thus no longer oceanfront property.Respondents, the city of Destin and Walton County sought permits to restore 6.9 miles of beach eroded by several hurricanes, adding about 75 feet of dry sand seaward of the mean high-water line which was to become fixed as the erosion-control line.

Petitioner, a nonprofit corporation formed by owners of oceanfront property bordering a project, brought an unsuccessful administrative challenge.

Respondent, the Florida Department of Environmental Protection approved the permits, and this suit followed.

The District Court of Appeal for the first District concluded that the Department's order had eliminated the Petitioner member's right to receive accretions to their property, thus affecting an uncompensated, an unconstitutional taking.

The Court of Appeal, therefore set aside the order, remanded the proceeding and certified to the Florida Supreme Court the question whether the Act unconstitutionally deprived Petitioner's Members of littoral rights without just compensation.

The State Supreme Court answered “no” and quashed the remand, concluding that the Members did not own the property supposedly taken.

Petitioner sought rehearing on the ground that the Florida Supreme Court's decision affected a taking of Petitioner's member's littoral rights contrary to the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, rehearing was denied and we granted certiorari.

I will describe, first the holding of a plurality of the court in an opinion by Justice Scalia joined by me, Justice Thomas and Justice Alito.

Well, the classic thinking is a transfer of property to the state or to another private party by eminent domain, the Takings Clause applies to other state actions that achieve the same thing.

Thus we upheld that it is a taking, if the government recharacterize as public property what was previously private property.

The Takings Clause is not addressed to the action of a specific branch or branches, it is concerned simply with the act, and not the governmental actor, nor shall private property be taken is what it says.

There is no textual justification, for saying that the existence or the scope of a state's power to expropriate private property without just compensation, varies according to the branch of government affecting the expropriation.

Nor does common sense recommends such a principle, it would be absurd to allow a state to do by judicial decree what the Takings Clause forbids it to do by legislative fiat and our precedents provide no support for such a thing.

In some, if a Legislature or a Court declares that what was once an established right to private property, no longer exist.

It has taken that property, no less than if the state had physically appropriated it or destroyed its value by regulation.

The plurality opinion then rejects several arguments of respondents opposing the principle that there can be a judicial taking or adding to it, conditions that would not apply to a legislative or executive taking.

One is that the Federal Courts lacked the knowledge of State Law, required to decide whether a judicial decision that purports merely to clarify property rights has instead taken an established property right.

But in non-takings context, Federal Courts must often decide what state property rights exist and indeed they must do so to resolve claims that legislative or executive action has affected a taking.