Facts of the Case
Petitioner, an alleged consumer reporting agency, operated a “people search engine,” which searched a wide spectrum of databases to gather and provide personal information about individuals to a variety of users. Respondent discovered that his profile generated by petitioner contained inaccurate information. Respondent filed a federal class-action complaint, alleging that petitioner willfully failed to comply with the Fair Credit Reporting Act of 1970 (FCRA’s) requirements. The district court dismissed respondent’s complaint. The appellate court reversed the district court’s judgment. Supreme Court of the United States vacated the judgment and remanded the case.
Can Congress authorize a cause of action based on a violation of a federal statute and therefore confer Article III standing on a plaintiff who has not suffered concrete harm?
Because the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit did not properly address whether all the elements of standing were met, the Court vacated the case for reconsideration of whether the plaintiff alleged an injury in fact that was “concrete and particularized.” Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. delivered the opinion for the 6-2 majority, which held that, in order to have standing under Article III, a plaintiff must show that he has suffered an injury in fact that is fairly traceable to the defendant’s challenged conduct and is likely to be redressed by a favorable decision in court. The injury-in-fact element is met when the plaintiff shows that he suffered an invasion of a legally protected interest and that the injury was concrete and particularized as well as actual or imminent. The Court held that the standing principles of Article III mean that a plaintiff cannot bring a claim that alleges a bare procedural violation, but in determining whether the plaintiff proved that an injury in fact existed, the lower court must examine the elements of injury-in-fact analysis. Because the appellate court in this case failed to do so, the Court remanded the case for further consideration.In his concurring opinion, Justice Clarence Thomas wrote that the standing doctrine applies to both private citizens seeking to vindicate private rights as well as those who alleged violations of public rights. These limitations stem from how the common-law courts traditionally handled the two different types of claims. Therefore, Congress cannot create a new private right of action for the enforcement of public rights without such suits being subject to standing doctrine analysis.Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote a dissent in which she argued that it was not necessary to remand the case because the evidence presented was sufficient to prove that the injury at issue was concrete, and the particularity requirement does not need to be considered separately. In this case, the plaintiff was not alleging a general harm but rather an injury that he suffered individually, so because it meets the concreteness requirement, it does not need to meet a separate particularity one, and there is nothing for the lower court to consider on remand. Justice Sonia Sotomayor joined in the dissent.
- Citation: 578 US _ (2016)
- Granted: Apr 27, 2015
- Argued: Nov 2, 2015
- Decided May 16, 2016