National Woodwork Manufacturers Association v. National Labor Relations Board

PETITIONER: National Woodwork Manufacturers Association
RESPONDENT: National Labor Relations Board
LOCATION: Canada Packers LTD. Headquarters

DOCKET NO.: 110
DECIDED BY: Warren Court (1965-1967)
LOWER COURT: United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

CITATION: 386 US 612 (1967)
ARGUED: Jan 18, 1967 / Jan 19, 1967
DECIDED: Apr 17, 1967

Facts of the case

Question

Media for National Woodwork Manufacturers Association v. National Labor Relations Board

Audio Transcription for Oral Argument - January 18, 1967 in National Woodwork Manufacturers Association v. National Labor Relations Board

Audio Transcription for Oral Argument - January 19, 1967 in National Woodwork Manufacturers Association v. National Labor Relations Board

Dominick L. Manoli:

May it please the Court.

When the Court arose yesterday afternoon I was addressing myself for the contention of the other side that Section 8 (b) (4) (A) of the Taft-Hartley Amendments barred all so-called product boycotts.

I suggest that the use of the slogan, product boycotts, does not help -- really help us resolve our problem.

When Congress enacted legislation against product boycotts it had in mind a specific evil --

(Inaudible)

Dominick L. Manoli:

Product boycott.

(Inaudible)

Dominick L. Manoli:

Product.

Potter Stewart:

Product?

Dominick L. Manoli:

Yes.

Potter Stewart:

Thank you.

Dominick L. Manoli:

When Congress Congress enacted legislation against product boycotts, it had a specific evil in mind namely employer refusals to handle the products of another employer who was involved in a labor dispute or who was nonunion or who was otherwise disfavored, otherwise disfavored by the union representing those particular employees.

And that this was a device to exert to a neutral employer pressure, pressure upon the employer disfavored by the union.

Now in determining whether or not refusals to handle products coming from another employer, whether that was refusals are a violation of the statutes or whether or not we must look in the light of the purpose of Congress, we must look to the objective of the employees or the union that's directing them to refuse to handle the products coming from another employer.

Now, let me explain my meaning with two illustrations.

Supposed for example that you have my -- employer A, employer A buys doors from manufacturer B.

The employees of employer A are union.

Those of employer B are nonunion.

The employees of A refuse to install the doors coming from B because B's doors do not bear the union label and B, his employees are nonunion.

That was the situation under Sand Door Case which was before this Court several years ago.

Now let me give a second illustration.

Employer A under his contract with this collective bargaining agreement with his employees is required and has traditionally given them certain work to be done on doors, the finishing of unfinished doors.

Now employer A decides that he is going to buy finished doors.

And when these finished doors come to him, his employees refused to install those doors.

The reason that they are refusing to install those doors is because the employer in violation of his agreement not to assign the finishing work to someone else, to preserve it for them as -- deprive them of work which they have traditionally been performing and work which under their contract they're entitled to.

Now essentially, that is the case before this Court involving the employer of the contract to Frouge.

That is not a secondary boycott situation.

All that the two, the two examples which I've given can be loosely called as product boycotts.

As product boycotts, there are differences between --

(Inaudible)