Nashville Milk Company v. Carnation Company

PETITIONER: Nashville Milk Company
RESPONDENT: Carnation Company
LOCATION: Philadelphia Board of Public Education

DOCKET NO.: 67
DECIDED BY: Warren Court (1957-1958)
LOWER COURT: United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

CITATION: 355 US 373 (1958)
ARGUED: Nov 21, 1957
DECIDED: Jan 20, 1958

Facts of the case

Question

Media for Nashville Milk Company v. Carnation Company

Audio Transcription for Oral Argument - November 21, 1957 in Nashville Milk Company v. Carnation Company

Earl Warren:

Number 67, Nashville Milk Company, Petitioner versus Carnation Company.

Mr. Dixon, you may proceed.

Jerome F. Dixon:

May it please the Court.

I represent the petitioner who was the plaintiff below in a suit to recover treble damages caused by injuries by violations of Section 3 of the Robison-Patman Act.

The question presented here today in this suit now is whether a party injured by a violation of Section 3 has the right to sue for damages and injunction under Sections 4 and 16 of the Clayton Act.

Underlying that issue is whether Section 3 of the Robinson-Patman Act became a part of the Clayton Act.

If it did, then it's one of the antitrust laws for which remedy is given by Sections 4 and 16 of the Clayton Act.

Let me describe the Robinson-Patman Act in general now and I would be a little more particular of it later on.

It consists of four Sections.

Section 1 of the Act or Section 1 of the bill clearly amended Section 2 of the Clayton Act.

Section 2 of the bill and which is also in regard to Section 2 of the Act is a saving clause preserving rights of action under pending causes of action.

Section 3 is the Section in question here.

Section 4 is an exemption of cooperative associations from the provisions of the Act.

Our position briefly stated this time is that the internal or what might be called an internal evidence consisting of the Robinson-Patman Act itself.

And what I might call the external evidence consisting of the debates in the proceedings in Congress, all, I contend, clearly show that Congress intended that all Sections of the Robinson-Patman Act should amend and become a part of the Clayton Act.

Now, let's get back to the Clayton Act for a moment.

Sections 4 and 16 of the Clayton Act, respectively, give the rights of action for treble damages and for injunction for injuries and violation of “the antitrust laws.”

Section 1 of the Clayton Act defines antitrust laws and it provides that the antitrust law shall include three named acts.

These acts are named by their titles.

One is the Sherman Act the title is given.

One is the Wilson Tariff Act and the third is the Clayton Act itself.

Therefore, whether a cause of action exist to the plaintiff here under Section 3 of the Robinson-Patman Act depends upon whether of not Section 3, became a part of the Clayton Act.

We contend it did by amendment.

Now the --

At the time that -- at the time that Section 1 was passed defining antirust laws, were there other statutes on the books within colloquial parlance could be called antitrust (Voice Overlap) --

Jerome F. Dixon:

The Sherman Act?

No, I mean the Sherman Act the --

Jerome F. Dixon:

And the Wilson Tariff Act.

-- Wilson Tariff Act and the Clayton Act.

Now beyond those were there other statutes (Voice Overlap) --