Michigan v. Harvey

PETITIONER: Michigan
RESPONDENT: Harvey
LOCATION: Doby’s Motel Court

DOCKET NO.: 88-512
DECIDED BY: Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)
LOWER COURT: State appellate court

CITATION: 494 US 344 (1990)
ARGUED: Oct 11, 1989
DECIDED: Mar 05, 1990

ADVOCATES:
Robert M. Morgan - on behalf of the Respondent
Timothy A. Baughman - on behalf of the Petitioner

Facts of the case

Question

Media for Michigan v. Harvey

Audio Transcription for Oral Argument - October 11, 1989 in Michigan v. Harvey

William H. Rehnquist:

We'll hear argument first this morning in No. 88-512, Michigan v. Tyris Lemont Harvey.

Mr. Baughman.

Timothy A. Baughman:

Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court:

The issue before the Court today is whether an accused may be cross-examined with the statement taken subsequent to the assertion of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel as that right has been construed in Michigan v. Jackson.

I wish to present for the Court's consideration this morning two principal points.

The first is that exclusion of evidence for impeachment purposes is an inappropriate remedy for violation of a prophylactic rule, and that Jackson is such a rule.

But, secondly, and perhaps more fundamentally, that exclusion of evidence for impeachment purposes is also inappropriate for violation of the Sixth Amendment as it relates to custodial interrogation.

The facts, very briefly put, in this case are these.

The victim in this case testified that respondent raped and beat her, causing three fractures to her left eye socket.

Respondent, on the other hand, testified that the episode was essentially an agreement to exchange sex for cocaine gone wrong, and that the blows that he struck were in self-defense.

The prosecutor questioned respondent about a statement that he had made after arraignment and assertion of the right to counsel.

That statement came to be taken when respondent told the police officer that he wished to make another statement.

But he then also said that he didn't know whether or not he should talk to his attorney.

The officer stated that that would not be necessary, as his attorney would be supplied a copy of any statement that he might make.

The assistant prosecutor stated that it was because of this colloquy between respondent and the attorney that she did not believe that the statement was admissible in the case in chief.

However, she did argue that it was admissible for impeachment purposes, arguing that it was not involuntary.

Sandra Day O'Connor:

Mr. Baughman.

Timothy A. Baughman:

Yes.

Sandra Day O'Connor:

I guess you concede that there is a Sixth Amendment violation here.

Timothy A. Baughman:

Yes.

The prosecutor at trial conceded that the colloquy between the respondent and the police officer rendered the statement involuntary... I mean, inadmissible in the case in chief, and we are not contesting that.

Sandra Day O'Connor:

When did the Sixth Amendment violation occur?

Timothy A. Baughman:

I would say that it occurred when the police officer continued to question respondent after the colloquy about whether or not he should talk to his attorney.

Sandra Day O'Connor:

Is the admission of the statements at trial itself a Sixth Amendment violation or not?

Timothy A. Baughman:

Well... yes.

The Sixth Amendment was not violated, I would say, by the taking of the statement.

If the prosecutor had never used it for any purpose there wouldn't be a violation.

Sandra Day O'Connor:

You don't think there's a violation even though he didn't use it?

Timothy A. Baughman:

Well, I would say if... if nothing was used at trial, the issue wouldn't be presented as--

Sandra Day O'Connor:

I thought you had told me the violation occurred when the statements were taken.