RESPONDENT: C. H. Langdeau, Receiver for I.C.T. Ins. Co.
LOCATION: Taylor Street Pharmacy
DOCKET NO.: 14
DECIDED BY: Warren Court (1962-1965)
LOWER COURT: Supreme Court of Texas
CITATION: 371 US 555 (1963)
ARGUED: Feb 27, 1962 / Feb 28, 1962
REARGUED: Dec 05, 1962
DECIDED: Jan 21, 1963
Hubert D. Johnson - for the appellants
Marvin S. Sloman - for the appellants on reargument
Quentin Keith - for the appellee
William E. Cureton - for the appellee
Facts of the case
Media for Mercantile Nat'l Bank at Dallas v. Langdeau
- Oral Argument - February 28, 1962
- Oral Reargument - December 05, 1962
- Oral Argument - February 27, 1962
Audio Transcription for Oral Argument - February 27, 1962 in Mercantile Nat'l Bank at Dallas v. Langdeau
Audio Transcription for Oral Argument - February 28, 1962 in Mercantile Nat'l Bank at Dallas v. Langdeau
Mercantile National Bank at Dallas, Appellant, versus C. H. Langdeau, Receiver and Number 91, Republic National Bank of Dallas, versus C. H. Langdeau, Receiver.
Mr. Keith, you may continue your argument.
Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court.
Upon adjournment yesterday afternoon, I have words about to pass to another phase of the matter.
That is to say, I do not dispute the fact that this Court can always determine the finality of a state court judgment and the determination of the finality of a state court judgment as a matter for this Court to determine.
So, our Texas practice will not control, of course and I so hope can see, with Your Honors' permission I'll now pass on to the -- the matters involved in this lawsuit as -- if it reaches the merits, the Court reaches the merits of the consideration of this suit originated with Mr. Langdeau as the receiver appointed of an insolvent insurance company.
He was appointed a receiver under our Liquidation Code or under our Insurance Code.
This is a lawsuit that was brought under the provisions of a particular Texas statute which says in substance and it is quoted in our brief “that the Court of competent jurisdiction of the county in which delinquency proceedings are pending, under this Act shall have venue to hear and determine all actions and proceedings et cetera instituted by the receiver”.
That is followed by another provision of the code which says a court, unless the same clearly appears to the contrary from the text, means that court in which the delinquency proceedings are pending.
Now, I say to you, Your Honor, that this is the type of a case that the Supreme Court mentioned and had in mind when they brought upon the decision in Casey against Adams.
It was your -- with the Court's permission, I would like to quote very briefly from Casey against Adams.
That is the case Mr. Johnson alluded to very briefly yesterday.
That is the only case by this Court which squarely presents a question involved in this case.
That is to say whether or not this particular -- peculiar federal statute relating to national banks must be observed in every instance and that there are no exceptions.
I don't -- Mr. Keith --
I fully understand what was decided in Morgan but I do not quite see why you say it wasn't presented there.
I've -- I had not alluded to Morgan if -- if Your Honor please.
I was speaking --
But you just said, the only -- you just said that Casey was the only case in which that issue would (Voice Overlap).
The Morgan case, sir, if I may allude to it.
The Morgan case held that the bank had waived this right.
I understand that.
I fully understand that.
I understand that.
All I'm saying is that before they got to waive, they considered -- the Court considered quite extensively, what it is that required waiver or what -- what is -- what's involved in the waiver.