RESPONDENT: New Yorker Magazine, Inc.
LOCATION: New Yorker Magazine
DOCKET NO.: 89-1799
DECIDED BY: Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)
LOWER COURT: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
CITATION: 501 US 496 (1991)
ARGUED: Jan 14, 1991
DECIDED: Jun 20, 1991
Charles Morgan, Jr. - on behalf of the Petitioner
H. Bartow Farr, III - Argued the cause for the respondents
Facts of the case
After Jeffrey Masson was fired from his position at the Sigmund Freud Archives, Janet Malcolm interviewed him for an article in the New Yorker magazine. Malcolm_s article included many long direct quotations from Masson. The article presented Masson as extremely arrogant and condescending; at one point, he was quoted as calling himself "the greatest analyst who ever lived." However, Malcolm fabricated many of the more distasteful quotations. Masson sued for libel. The District Court dismissed the case on First Amendment free speech grounds because Masson was a public figure.
Does the First Amendment give the New Yorker a right to publish fabricated quotations attributed to a public figure?
Media for Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc.Audio Transcription for Oral Argument - January 14, 1991 in Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc.
Audio Transcription for Opinion Announcement - June 20, 1991 in Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc.
William H. Rehnquist:
The opinion of the Court in No. 89-1799, Masson against New Yorker Magazine will be announced by Justice Kennedy.
Anthony M. Kennedy:
This case, Masson versus New Yorker Magazine comes before us on a writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
Jeffrey Masson was a scholar who turned to the study of psychoanalysis.
He became project's director on the staff of the Sigmund Freud Archives.
Disagreements arose and he was terminated.
Masson's own story and the whole background of the dispute were of sufficient interest to Janet Malcolm, an author, that she wrote an article about Masson and about the Archives.
She wrote the article after a series of interviews with Masson, many of which were tape recorded.
The article was published first as a series in the New Yorker Magazine, and then as a book.
Her work received complimentary reviews, and this gave little joy to Masson, however, for the articles portrayed him in the most unflattering light.
Masson sued Malcolm, the New Yorker Magazine, and the book publisher for defamation.
Malcolm's narrative device consists of enclosing lengthily passages in quotation marks.
According to Masson, a member of the key passages in the article that purport to quote him were fabrications, attributing to him words he never spoke.
His position in the litigation has been that Malcolm's alteration of the quotations show the actual malice that is necessary for him to take his case to a jury.
He conceives he is a public figure in the case so he must need the actual malice standard.
Actual malice is a shorthand term, a term of art we use, perhaps it is an unfortunate phrase.
It does not indicate ill will or animosity.
It means, in the context of a defamation suit, that a statement is made with knowledge of falsity or with reckless disregard for truth or falsity.
Both the District Court and the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ruled that Masson had not shown actual malice in this sense because the quotations were irrational interpretation of the things that Masson had said.
We granted certiorari and we now reverse.
This case comes to us after a summary judgment was granted, so we must assume that Malcolm acted with the required mental state and that the quotations were in fact altered.
Masson must still prove these matters, and the questions whether he can prevail if he does so.
In some sense, any alteration of a verbatim quotation is false, but writers and reporters by necessity alter what people say at the very least to eliminate grammatical or syntactical infelicities.
If every alteration constituted the falsity required to prove actual malice, the practice of journalism would require a radical change, when inconsistent with our precedents and First Amendment principles.
We reject the idea that any alteration beyond correction of grammar or syntax by a self-proof falsity in the sense relevant to determining actual malice, technical distinctions between correcting grammar and syntax and some greater level of alteration do not appear workable.
We can think of no method by which courts or juries would draw the line between these and other changes except by reference to the meaning a statement conveys to a reasonable reader.
On the other hand, we also reject the Court of Appeals' views of our cases that any rational interpretation of an ambiguous statement is permitted when quotation marks are used.
Quotation marks used in an orthodox manner indicate to the reader that the author is not interpreting the speaker's ambiguous statement but is attempting to convey what the speaker said.
Were we to assess quotations under a rational interpretation standard, we would give journalists the freedom to place statements in their subject's mouths without fear of liability.
By eliminating any method of distinguishing between the statement of the subject and the interpretation of the author, we would diminish the trustworthiness of the printed word and eliminate any real meaning of quotations.
In order to prove falsity, we require that an altered statement convey a materially different meaning to the reader than the actual statement.