Lafler v. Cooper

PETITIONER: Blaine Lafler, Warden
RESPONDENT: Anthony Cooper
LOCATION: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

DOCKET NO.: 10-209
DECIDED BY: Roberts Court (2010-2016)
LOWER COURT: United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

CITATION: 566 US (2012)
GRANTED: Jan 07, 2011
ARGUED: Oct 31, 2011
DECIDED: Mar 21, 2012

John J. Bursch - Solicitor General of Michigan, for the petitioner
Valerie R. Newman - for the respondent appointed by the Court
William M. Jay - Assistant to the Solicitor Gen­ eral, Department of Justice, for United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioner

Facts of the case

Anthony Cooper was convicted of shooting a woman in the thigh and buttocks after missing a shot to her head. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 6th Circuit overturned the conviction after Cooper claimed ineffective assistance of counsel. His lawyer told him not to take a plea offer, thinking that there could not be a finding that Cooper intended to murder his victim. But Cooper was convicted of assault with intent to murder and other charges. The appeals court said the incorrect advice equals unconstitutional ineffective assistance and ordered Cooper released. But Michigan officials argue that Cooper got a fair trial and that the verdict should not be thrown out because of his lawyer's mistake.


Is a state habeas petitioner entitled to relief when his counsel deficiently advises him to reject a favorable plea bargain but the defendant is later convicted and sentenced pursuant to a fair trial?

Media for Lafler v. Cooper

Audio Transcription for Opinion Announcement - March 21, 2012 (Part 1) in Lafler v. Cooper
Audio Transcription for Oral Argument - October 31, 2011 in Lafler v. Cooper

Audio Transcription for Opinion Announcement - March 21, 2012 (Part 2) in Lafler v. Cooper

Antonin Scalia:

As you heard, I filed a dissent in each of these cases.

In Missouri versus Frye, the Chief Justice and Justices Thomas and Alito have joined my dissent.

In Lafler, Justice Thomas has joined in full and the Chief Justice has joined all but one part.

I have not taken the trouble to figure out which of my following comments have been joined by whom, lest I put words in other people mouths, you can assume I speak only for myself and Justice Thomas.

Let me begin with our prior case law to which the majority opinions today claimed to be faithful.

For nearly three decades, ever since we decided the seminal case of Strickland versus Washington dealing within effective assistance of counsel, we have explained that the ultimate focus, “the ultimate focus" in any ineffective assistance case must be "the fundamental fairness of the proceeding whose result is being challenged".

The test was not whether the result would have been different but for the ineffective assistance, but whether the in effective assistance destroyed the fairness of the conviction.

Thus in a case called Lockhart versus Fretwell, decided in 1993, counsel had failed to make an objection which under the then current law pronounced by the Court of Appeals would have compelled the trial court to give the defendant a life sentence instead of the death sentence that he, in fact, received.

We nonetheless found no ineffective assistance in the constitutional sense because that case from the Court of Appeals was wrong and had later been reversed by this Court.

So, even though counsel's error deprived the defendant of a life sentence, that's what he would have gotten.

It did not deprive him of a fair trial. Today's opinion changes that.

There is not doubt that the defendants in these cases were convicted and sentenced pursuant to fair and constitutionally valid procedures.

One of them got the gold standard of American justice, a full-dress jury trial before 12 men and women tried and true, who unanimously found him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

The other defendant confessed his guilt after a judicial proceeding that assured his confession was voluntary and true.

They are both without a doubt guilty, they do not claim otherwise, and have been a judge so and sentenced by the fairest of procedures.

What they claim in this appeal is that they should not have had to suffer fair conviction and sentence because it was only mistake of counsel that deprived them of a better plea deal, a few words about plea bargaining.

In many, perhaps most countries of the world, American style plea bargaining, at least in cases such as serious as these, is forbidden, even for the purpose of obtaining testimony that enables conviction of a greater malefactor, much less simply to save the State the expense of trial.

In Europe, many countries adhere to what they call the "legality principle" which requires prosecutors to charge all offenses they believe they can prove.

In the United States, of course, we have plea bargaining a plenty, but until today, we have regarded it as a necessary evil.

Sure, it causes some people to plead guilty to offenses they are really not guilty of simply to avoid the enormous expense and the risk of being tried for higher offenses and sure, it causes a lot of guilty defendants, perhaps most of them, to get off with a less punishment than the law says they deserve.

Even so, we accept it because many believe that without plea bargaining, our long and expensive process of criminal trial could not sustain the burden imposed on it and our system of criminal justice would grind to a halt.

But until today, no one has thought that there is a constitutional right to a plea bargain, a constitutional right not to plead guilty on the basis of bad advice, yes, because pleading guilty deprives a defendant of a fair trial but not a constitutional right to plea bargain.

In all States and the Federal Government, the prosecution does not have to offer a plea bargain.

The prosecution can withdraw it until it is accepted and even after it has been accepted, the judge can refuse to approve it.

In some States, including Missouri, the State involved in Frye, the plea offer can be withdrawn by the prosecution even after the defendant has accepted it, right up until the time that the judge approves it and accepts the defendant's guilty plea.

After today, however, plea bargaining is no longer a somewhat embarrassing adjunct to our criminal justice system.

The Court says, quoting approvingly from a law review article, "It is the criminal justice system."

And since it is, defendants are entitled, constitutionally entitled to have counsels who are effective plea bargainers, not in order to assure that the defendants get a fair trial but in order to assure that they have a fair chance to escape a fair trial and get less punishment than they deserve.

The Court today embraces the sporting chance theory of criminal law in which the State functions like a conscientious casino operator, giving each player a fair chance to beat the house, that is, to serve less time than the law says he deserves and when a player is excluded from the tables, his constitutional rights have been violated.

Today's opinions open a whole new field of constitutionalized criminal procedure, the field of plea bargaining law.