Why is the case important?
A police officer, without any knowledge an individual was engaged in any legality, requested that the individual stop in an ally because he “looked suspicious”. The individual refused to identify himself.
Facts of the case
“On December 9, 1977, El Paso Police Officers Venegas and Sotelo were cruising in a patrol car. At 12:45 p.m., they observed Zackary C. Brown and another man leaving an alley in opposite directions. The alley was in an area known for a high incidence of drug traffic. The officers believed the situation was suspicious and stopped Brown for questioning. They asked Brown to identify himself, and he refused and asserted that they had no cause to stop him. When the officers frisked him, they did not find any drugs or other suspicious material on Brown. He was arrested for violation of a Texas statute that made it illegal for a person to refuse to identify himself when a police officer lawfully requests it. Brown was taken to the county jail, where he did identify himself, and was charged with the violation.Brown was convicted in municipal court and fined. He then exercised his right to a trial in the county court and moved for dismissal on the grounds that the Texas statue was unconstitutional under the First, Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments. The motion was denied and he was convicted.”
Whether appellant was validly convicted for refusing to comply with a policeman’s demand that he identify himself pursuant to a provision of the Texas Penal Code which makes it a crime to refuse such identification on request?
“The majority first observed when the officers detained appellant for the purpose of requiring him to identify himself, they performed a seizure of his person subject to the requirements of the Fourth Amendment. Further, the reasonableness of seizures that are less intrusive than a traditional arrest, depends ‘on a balance between the public interest and the individual’s right to personal security free from arbitrary interference by law officers.’
The Supreme Court has recognized that the Fourth Amendment requires that a seizure must be based on specific, objective facts indicating that society’s legitimate interests require the seizure of the particular individual, or that the seizure must be carried out pursuant to a plan embodying explicit, neutral limitations on the conduct of individual officers. Officers have been required to have reasonable suspicion, based on objective facts, that the individual is involved in criminal activity.
The flaw in the State’s case is that none of the circumstances preceding the officers’ detention of appellant justified a reasonable suspicion that he was involved in criminal conduct.
The fact that appellant was in a neighborhood frequented by drug users, standing alone, is not a basis for concluding that appellant himself was engaged in criminal conduct. In short, the appellant’s activity was no different from the activity of other pedestrians in that neighborhood. When pressed, one of the officers acknowledged that the only reason he stopped appellant was to ascertain his identity. The record suggests an understandable desire to assert a police presence
The Supreme Court of the United States reversed the county court’s judgment, holding that the statute that required Brown to identify himself violated the Fourth Amendment because it required no basis for suspecting Brown of any misconduct. The Court further held that the Texas statute, as applied to Brown, violated the Fourth Amendment. When the officers detained Brown to obtain his name and address, they performed a seizure of his person subject to the requirements of the Fourth Amendment. However, the officers lacked any reasonable suspicion, based on objective facts, to believe that he was engaged or had engaged in criminal conduct. Thus, the risk of arbitrary and abusive police practices exceeded the tolerable limits.
- Case Brief: 1979
- Appellant: Zackary C. Brown
- Appellee: Texas
- Decided by: Burger Court
Citation: 443 US 47 (1979)
Argued: Feb 21, 1979
Decided: Jun 25, 1979
Granted Oct 16, 1978